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Purpose - The purpose of this study is to obtain insights into the systems of accountability 
within a company set up by the Lau provincial council in Fiji. It is the only company set up 
by any of the fourteen provincial councils in Fiji to be consistently profitable. Yet the study 
reveals poor accountability has prevailed within the company and by the company to its 
shareholders. This has led to the company generating fewer benefits to its shareholders and 
the province of Lau in general than would have been obtained with appropriate 
accountabilities in place.    
Design/methodology/approach – The paper explicates the system of accountability by case 
studying a Fiji provincial company. An in-depth case study was undertaken on the Lau 
provincial company, in order to analyse its system of accountability. Data was collected 
through content analysis of the annual reports and other information available in the public 
domain. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with the company executives and other 
stakeholders of the company.  
Findings - The study provides insights into the systems of accountability practised by the 
Lau provincial company and provided to the grassroots provincial population. Analysis of 
the entity studied revealed accountability has been influenced by the power distance in 
society, high levels of trust placed on those in authority, the culture of respect and silence, 
and the lack of attention to detail and planning. This has resulted in weak accountabilities 
being provided to the provincial population and hence, the need to consider exploring 
‘intelligent’ forms of accountability (Roberts, 2009) for the provincial population. 
Originality/value – This paper makes reference to Gelfand et al. (2004), in which they 
develop a framework to analyse accountability in a cultural context. This study is the first to 
employ their framework in a society from a developing economy, with a culture 
significantly different from that found in western developed economies where the bulk of 
research on issues of accountability has been undertaken. Contexts in which accountability 
is discharged, which Gelfand et al. acknowledge may exist, but do not explore are 
identified.  All fourteen provinces have set up companies to engage in their respective 
provinces’ economic development. This offers opportunities for future research, together 
with additional analysis on the cultural configuration of indigenous Fijian societies and their 
corresponding accountability system. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 “From the most primitive tribal systems to loosely structured alliances to the most 
sophisticated production systems, social systems of any sort demand, at some level, 
general agreement about expectations and rules guiding behaviour…social systems 
can be defined in terms of shared expectations…Thus, accountability is at the root of 
viable social systems, and all the more so in formal organisations.” (Frink and 
Klimoski, 2004, p. 2) 
 
Accountability is a “distinctive and universal feature of any social system” (Bracci, 2009, p. 
294) and is essential for the maintenance of any social system (Gelfand et al., 2004). 
However, it is also recognized that the idea of accountability is  elusive (Sinclair, 1995) and 
“notoriously difficult to pin-down”(McKernan and McPhail 2012, p. 177). Roberts and 
Scapens (1985) laid out the widely understood explanation of accountability as “the giving 
and demanding of reasons for conduct” (p.447). Such an understanding of accountability 
could result in accountability being “framed in the context of reporting mechanisms only” 
(Smyth, 2012, p 231).  
It is recognized that accountability is grounded in ‘calculation’ and ‘discourse and 
narrative’(McKernan and McPhail 2012, p. 177). As currently understood the “calculative 
face of accountability has been dominant” (ibid) and the ‘discourse and narrative’ mode of 
accountability “is consistently undervalued and often suppressed in theory and practice” 
(Boland and Schultze 1996, as cited from McKernan and McPhail 2012, p. 177). 
Gelfand et al. (2004, p.136) argues that much of the theory and research of 
accountability in organisations has focused almost exclusively on Western contexts such as 
United States and Western Europe in the context of agency theory, focusing on the principal 
agent relationship. Gelfand et al. recognise the potential for mutual accountability and 
influence in a given setting, allowing them to arrive at the following definition of 
accountability,-  
“the perception of being answerable for actions and decisions, in accordance with 
interpersonal, social, and structural contingencies, all of which are embedded in 
particular sociocultural contexts” (p.137).  
Gelfand et al. then develop the cultural accountability configurations positing how 
characteristics of accountability are influenced by the dominant cultural dimensions [1] in a 
particular society. The high power distance that exists between the indigenous Fijian chiefs 
and the indigenous population and the communal cultural values of indigenous Fijian 
society (see Davie, 2007; Rika et al., 2008) make Gelfand et al.’s definition of 
accountability and theoretical framework, an appropriate tool to analyse accountability in 
Fiji’s provincial companies.  
In this paper we set out to contribute to this stream of literature on the limitations of 
calculative accountability to the grassroots and utilizing Gelfand et al.  We consider the 
accountability configurations in play in an indigenously owned provincial company and 
argue that they differ from the configurations that will yield appropriate accountability in 
the prevailing culture.  
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The balance of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the background 
information on Fiji’s provincial councils and companies, specifically the case studied 
province and company. Section 3 sets out a review of the literature and the theoretical 
background of cultural accountability configurations (Gelfand et al., 2004).  Section 4 
explains the research issue and methodology. The findings with respect to the 
accountabilities within the Lau provincial company are presented in section 5. Finally, 
section 6 provides a discussion of the findings and offers some concluding comments. 
2. Fiji’s Provincial Councils and Companies: an overview 
Subsequent to annexing Fiji in 1874, Britain established fourteen provinces as 
administrative units installing chiefs as Roko (provincial governor) or Buli (district chiefs) 
among the indigenous population to maintain an orderly society, training them as provincial 
administrators (Durutalo, 1997). Each province has their provincial administrative office 
staffed by the iTaukei Affairs Board[2] (TAB) and a provincial council, which comprises of 
provincial chiefs and elected representatives from the province[3].This entrenched a 
hierarchical authoritarian social system, where orders filtered from the apex to the base and 
obedience, with allegiance filtered back from the base to the apex (Durutalo, 1997, p. 7).  
The chiefs were elevated to greater status and authority in 1945 during the 
reorganization of the Fijian Administration, which gave leading chiefs almost full command  
over Fijian affairs (Norton, 2002). This strengthened their authority as provincial/district 
administrators, and established the chiefly authority as an autonomous body within the 
government of Fiji. The chiefly bureaucratic and political elite were projected as the 
guardians of indigenous Fijian identity, culture and economic benefits in the face of the 
growing Indian population[4] (Durutalo, op cit., p. 138; Norton, 2002, p. 108). The 
reinforcement of the chiefly hegemony through the creation of provincial councils created a 
recognised political and social aristocracy within the indigenous Fijian community (Davie 
2005, p. 522), which served to establish them as a group where authority is above question. 
Such institutions became part of indigenous Fijian social structure and in 2002 when a 
government commissioned committee made recommendations to restructure such 
institutions this was “out-rightly rejected by the indigenous Fijian political elites who 
wanted to maintain the neo-colonial order” (Ratuva 2005, p. 9).  While the influence of this 
aristocracy has been eroded at the national level by the coup d'état of 2006, chiefs are still 
highly influential in provincial affairs (see Rika et al., 2008). 
Provincial councils are provided with limited central government finance a levy is also 
imposed on indigenous adult males to help meet their provincial administrative office 
operating costs. This is payable whether an individual lives in their province of origin or 
not. In practice the burden of meeting the levy falls on those actually living in the province, 
collecting the levies from ‘expatriates’ proving to be virtually impossible. In Lau’s case this 
can be particularly serious for the resident population, as the vast majority of its members 
live out of the province.  
The provincial councils’ role has evolved from provincial administration to one of 
facilitating indigenous Fijian participation in commerce with the establishment of one, or 
more, provincial companies to operate as their commercial arm to contribute to their 
provinces’ economic development. Provincial chiefs have typically taken a key role in 
establishing these companies and in some cases assuming roles as company executives. In 
conventional terms, these companies have not been a success, with such companies typically 
reporting losses (Qalo, 1984; Ratuva, 2002). 
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This paper case studies the Lau provincial company, which would appear to be the 
stand out exception, having reported profits in all years since its inception. The Lau 
provincial company was established in October 1971 at the instigation of the province’s 
paramount chief at that time[5], who established the company with the financial assistance 
of the province, to operate as an investment vehicle Instead of investing in economic 
activities within the province the company holds assets on Fiji’s mainland where far more 
investment opportunities are available. These include investments in financial and real 
assets, including hotels and a tourist facility[6].  
2.1 Background on the Lau Province  
The Lau group of islands lie in an arc some 150 to 200 miles east of Viti Levu, the main 
island of Fiji, and about 300 miles north-west of Tonga (Hooper, 1982). The Lau province 
comprises of fifty seven islands totalling around 490 square kilometres of which only 19 
islands are inhabited, with a population of around 10,700 people living in the Lau islands 
and 57,485 Lauans[7] residing outside of Lau 
(http://www.statsfiji.gov.fj/Census2007/census07_index2.htm).  
Hooper (1982) explains that an understanding of the Lauan notion of chieftainship is 
essential to an understanding of Lauan society as a whole.  
“The chiefdom of Lau has been an integrated unit under the authority of the paramount 
chief (Sau ni Vanua ko Lau) since the late eighteenth century… and recognize the 
authority of the Sau ni Vanua ko Lau[8] and participate in enterprises which he 
sponsors…” (Hooper, 1982, p. 47) 
The Lau province has 13 districts (Tikina) and 72 villages. Each Tikina will have a 
number of villages and each village is further divided into Mataqali(s) (clans) and the 
Mataqali is further divided into Tokatoka(s) (extended family units). Each Tikina have their 
own chief and so does each village, however, the paramount chief for the Lau province is 
known as the Sau ni Vanua ko Lau. 
Hooper (1982) explained that “…membership of exogamous clans is in most cases 
determined by patrilineal descent; children are born as members of their father’s clan…” (p. 
26). Hooper (ibid) in describing the interactions of groups of people in Lau noted that 
“Honour and respect for elders is one of the fundamental codes of Lauan life and 
this is reflected in allowing precedence to elders, and especially to those who are 
leaders of their clans…this comes about naturally…” (p. 31) 
“Forms of respect for the paramount chief are most marked, since he is the highest 
authority in the chiefdom of Lau…all minor chiefdoms recognize the authority of the 
paramount chief, the Sau ni Vanua, who resides at Tubou, Lakeba.” (p. 46) 
Hooper (ibid, p. 33) further noted that it is not his intention to create an impression that  
“…Lauan social life is restricted and rule-bound…”, however, these “…are social 
graces that are learnt by all members of this society from childhood and their 
implementation is part of the natural flow of things…”  
“It is not a restricting convenience but an almost instinctive and therefore 
comfortable aspect of life.”  
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2.2 Background on the Lau Provincial Company 
The Lau provincial company was established in December, 1971 at the instigation of the 
late paramount chief of Lau who was also the chair of the Lau Provincial Council. He 
Chaired the Board of Directors at the company’s inception until his death in 2008 and has 
been succeeded by his daughter, who also enjoys high chiefly status.   
In the company’s annual reports (2007-2009) the vision articulated is to “aspire to 
become one of Fiji’s most successful investment companies” with a mission statement to be 
“...the preferred investment choice for the people of Lau”. In the initial interviews with the 
company’s chief executive officer (CEO), he explained 
“…the company was established to uplift the quality of life of the province, as the 
Lau province was isolated in comparison to other provinces in Fiji” (Interview 
Transcript, CEO 2009) 
The Lau provincial company’s share capital has been raised in a number of ways. It is 
by no means clear that shares have been assigned consistent with the contributions made by 
investors. The provincial council may have drawn on the levy in accumulating funds to 
provide equity for the company. Equity was certainly raised through communal fundraising 
activities and from statutory deductions, made from cash flows accruing to copra growers 
and communally owned plantations. The Lau provincial council holds shares in the 
provincial company in its own right. Financial contributions to the council’s funds would 
have facilitated this investment. However sufficient capital could not be raised within the 
province to sustain planned business activity. The provincial council itself made capital 
injections into the company by utilising an annual government grant of $100,000 provided 
under a government funded Development Assistance Scheme (DAS). Instead of using these 
monies to fund village projects, villages were allocated shares in the company. Until the 
paramount chief’s death in 2008 dividends accruing on shares held by the council were 
directly reinvested in the company. Dividends on all communally held shares have also been 
reinvested as a matter of course, in line with direction from the Paramount Chief and chair 
of the company’s board. Additionally, a number of shares are held by individuals from the 
Lau province.  
Since 2007 additional capital has also been obtained from issuing ‘B’ class shares to 
Fiji’s population at large. ‘A’ and ‘B’ class shareholders have identical rights to dividends, 
but B class shareholders have no voting rights and are restricted to a single representative on 
the Board of Directors. The Lau provincial company has operated primarily as an 
investment vehicle.  
The company has twelve members in its Board of Directors[9], which is the maximum 
number of Directors as noted in the company’s Articles of Association and the selection of 
the Board members as explained by the CEO is as follows 
“Two Directors have like automatic seats which is part of the company’s Articles of 
Association, which provides that a male and female heir of the founder get direct 
seats, and the Lau Provincial Council has a seat, than the second largest 
shareholder gets a seat, also two female directors chosen by the area they represent 
but elected at the AGM. B Class Director is nominated by the Board and approved 
at the AGM, so what has happened in the past is the larger Class B shareholders 
have put up names, this goes through the Board and Board nominates who to the 
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AGM. The rest of the Board of Directors are elected at the AGM by the 
shareholders” …” (CEO Interview Transcript, 2008) 
The Lau provincial company offices are located in Suva, Fiji’s capital, and its annual 
general meetings are held at the company owned hotel there. While there are practical 
reasons for this, attendance at the annual general meeting (AGM) becomes prohibitively 
expensive for shareholders living in Lau. Shareholders attending the AGM are typically 
‘Lauan expatriates’, who may serve as proxies for the communal shareholding of their 
village of origin. 
Company representatives seek to ensure contact with its ‘A’ class shareholders by 
accompanying provincial council officers on liaison visits to the island communities and to 
meet with Lauans now living in Fiji’s mainland. It was at such a meeting that Lauans 
residing on the mainland raised the following issue,- 
“…….if the assets strength of the company is over $32 million, why is the province 
facing the greatest challenge of transporting people and cargo in and out of the 
island?” (Provincial Council office Annual Report 2009) 
The company’s CEO response was,- 
“…the company has no intention of going into shipping business and also the board 
does not approve of this business venture…” (Provincial Council office Annual 
Report 2009) 
The company’s finance manager has also reiterated,- 
“…….we do not have any interest at the moment of providing non- economic returns 
to the province. We definitely will not go into shipping. On a social corporate 
responsibility side we probably will look at some projects to assist the province with 
other partner donors, probably in two years’ time.”(Finance Manager Interview 
Transcript, 2011)  
 
3. Accountability: review of the literature 
Accountability systems have always been fundamental for the survival and functioning of 
social systems (Bracci, 2009; Gelfand et al., 2004). This is as systems of accountability use 
devices of control to reduce the variability of human behaviour and produce stable patterns 
of activity (Gelfand et al., 2004). Hence, not only does accountability serve as a way to 
achieve external legitimation but also fosters effective functioning within societies (Gelfand 
et al., 2004). As reflected by Roberts (1991) accountability processes reflect 
interdependence within social relationships.  
Accountability is a “distinctive and universal feature of any social system” (Bracci, 
2009, p. 294) and is essential to the maintenance of a social system (Gelfand, et al., 2004). 
This is as social systems maintain order and coordination between individuals, by creating 
standards to which individuals and groups are answerable, and to which entities are judged 
and sanctioned (Schlenker and Weigold, 1989; as cited in Gelfand et al., 2004). It is systems 
of accountability that provide such moral order, creating a complex system of reciprocal 
rights and obligations (Roberts and Scapens, 1985).  Involving monitoring, evaluation and 
control of organizational agents to ensure they behave in the interests of the shareholders 
and other stakeholders (Keasey & Wright, 1993). It is in systems of accountability that 
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individuals, groups and organizations, behaviours, results and experiences are made visible 
and intelligible to others. This produces an organisation which is more cohesive and 
coherent (Bracci, 2009; Llewellyn, 1994).  
Accountability, according to Boland and Schultze (1996, p. 62) “…is the capacity and 
willingness to give explanations for conduct, stating how one has discharged one’s 
responsibility’. Similarly, Broadbent and Laughlin (2003, p. 24) referred to accountability as 
“associated with giving reasons for conduct for responsibilities or authority granted”.  
Roberts and Scapens (1985, p. 447) explained that at the heart of the accountability process 
is the “giving and demanding of reasons for conduct”. Smyth (2012, p. 231) pointed out that 
such definitions are “…essentially limited to the issue of answerability”, where 
“accountability is framed in the context of reporting mechanisms only” and it becomes 
possible to “fulfil the requirements of answerability without meeting the requirements of 
accountability” (Harris and Spannier, 1976, p. 254 as cited from Smyth, 2012 p. 231).  
Lindkvist and Llewellyn (2003, p. 252) highlight that often in the literature the terms 
‘responsibility’ and ‘accountability’ are used interchangeably and there have been little 
agreement on their definitions. In differentiating between the two terms Lindkvist and 
Llewellyn (ibid) suggest that “accountability tends to connote instrumentality and external 
controls, whereas responsibility to a greater extent connotes morality and inner controls”. 
Similarly, Bracci explained (2009, p. 297) “felt responsibility is an internal path” (emphasis 
added), which has to be accepted by someone either formally or informally, whereas, 
“accountability is the external, social and public process”.  
Bracci (2009) further adds another concept that of “autonomy” to accountability and 
responsibility relationships. That is individual or social responsibility can only be effective 
if autonomy to make decisions and solve problems is given (ibid). Thus, for an individual to 
be accountable he or she “needs to be autonomous in the sense of having the possibility to 
achieve the given objectives and be held responsible” (ibid, p. 297).  On the other hand, 
where there is autonomy without accountability, this may lead to lack of responsibility in 
the organization (Bracci, 2009). 
Sinclair (1995, pp. 219-20) suggested “accountability will be enhanced by recognizing 
the multiple ways in which accountability is experienced”. Rather than focusing on the 
“chameleon quality of its definition...to increase accountability, there is a need to understand 
how it is constructed by, and extracted from, those who are held accountable” (Sinclair, 
1995, p. 220). Similarly, Laughlin (2000) suggested research in accountability can only be 
fully developed through a wide range of empirical case studies in different cultural settings. 
This has resulted in an increase in research interests trying to theorize how accountability is 
actually exercised in practice in different situations (Laughlin, 2000), as it is recognized that 
accountability is socially constructed (Sinclair, 1995).  
The broad literature on accountability has identified various forms of accountability 
such as: formal and informal (Roberts and Scapens, 1985); contractual, administrative and 
communal (Birkett, 1988); ‘individualising’ and ‘socialising’ (Roberts, 1991; 1996); 
political, public, managerial, professional and personal (Sinclair, 1995); contractual and 
communal (Laughlin, 1996); and hierarchical and lateral (Willmott, 1996). Therefore the 
meaning of accountability is drawn from, or specific to, the context in which it is studied. 
The recent literature (Gibbon, 2012; Joannides, 2012; McKernan and McPhail 2012; 
McKernan, 2012; Smyth, 2012) raised the criticism that the “calculative face of 
accountability has been dominant” (McKernan and McPhail 2012, p. 177), especially seen 
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in the “calculative technologies of accountancy” (Miller 1992, p. 240 as cited from 
McKernan and McPhail 2012), which often “hardens into exclusionary forms” (McKernan, 
2012, p. 273). Accounting records are imposed by managers as the “privileged form of 
account” which follows from a hierarchic form of accountability (Roberts, 1991, as cited 
from Joannides, 2012, p. 246).  Hence, “calculation is foundational to the production of 
sovereign subjects capable of bearing responsibility and accountability” (McKernan and 
McPhail 2012, p. 178). The calculative face with its quantitative practices has dominated 
accountability since its inception and continues to do so (McKernan and McPhail 2012).The 
accounts provide objective facts, “hard evidence, numbers that speak for themselves, no 
interpretation needed, no narrative required, and the only story a “story of no story to tell”, 
numbers can always be verified, even proven” (ibid, p. 179). Thus, there is no need for the 
others belief as “numbers, counting, or quantification triumphs over belief” (Kamuf, 2007, 
p. 252). 
Bracci (2009) argues that such hierarchical accountability in organisations tend to be 
similar, whereas, “lateral accountability and the type of cross-level relationships are highly 
contextual” (p. 299). Gibbon (2012, p. 202) reiterates the call made by Roberts (2009) for “a 
more intelligent form of accountability…one that is reflective, incoherent, socially 
significant and acknowledges our interdependence whilst overcoming the preoccupation 
with individualized and hierarchical accountabilities”. This accepts that accountability 
cannot be understood as a “clear formal linear process of responsibility” (Gibbon, 2012, p. 
201) but is “political and emotional”, “uncertain, complex and messy”, “multi-dimensional 
and processual” and concludes “accountability is about our lived experience” (ibid, p. 211). 
Hence, the need to pause, stop and reflect on what accountability means or could mean in a 
specific context (ibid). 
Joannides (2012) considers the accountability provided at the “grassroots level” (p. 244) 
where there is “no guarantee that givers and demanders of accounts are in nature transparent 
enough to each other to make such records eventuate and thus play their monitoring role” (p. 
244). This is as accountability has its limits as highlighted by Messner (2009) where the 
accountable self is “an opaque, exposed, and mediated self that is inherently limited in its 
ability to give an account of itself. Because of these limits, we cannot expect demands for 
accountability always to be fully met” (p. 918, emphasis added). Joannides (2012, p. 247) 
reviewing Roberts (2009), Messner (2009) and McKernan (2012) concludes “accountability 
emerges as an unreachable ideal” and refers to Roberts (2009) suggestion on “returning to 
what one’s conscience orders would give rise to intelligent accountability” (Joannides, 
2012, p. 247). 
 
3.1 Cultural Accountability Configurations 
Gelfand et al. (2004) argue that as the primary cultural dimensions influence the norms and 
values of social systems, culture can be expected to impact on how society calls for 
accountability to be discharged. Gelfand et al. identify three pertinent cultural dimensions: 
individualism-collectivism, cultural tightness-looseness, and hierarchy-egalitarianism 
(power distance). These three dimensions serve to establish a framework in which 
accountability can be expected to be discharged within a society’s cultural norms. In so 
doing they demonstrate that appropriate accountability is to be understood as culture 
specific.   
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Gelfand et al. argue that there are four basic ways in which individualistic cultures 
differ from collectivistic cultures, in terms of accountability webs, i.e. cross-level 
connections[10], standards of accountability and nature of reactions to breaches of conduct. 
Firstly, in collectivistic cultures, an individual’s accountability is to entire groups, 
“which provide much of the expectations and monitoring for norm compliance” (Gelfand et 
al., p. 144). However for individualistic cultures, “accountability generally rests with 
specific individuals, both for organizational successes and failures”. Secondly, there exist 
differences in the number of cross-level connections. In collectivistic cultures “the group 
mediates the connection to the organization for the individual” (ibid, p. 145), whereas; in 
individualistic cultures “individuals primarily have connections to their immediate 
supervisors through rational contracts specifying particular expectations”.  Another 
difference relates to “extraorganisational sources of accountability”. Expectations from 
family members and the society at large that would be highly salient in collectivist cultures, 
but not in individualistic cultures. Consequently, cross-level connections would be fewer in 
individualistic cultures compared to collectivistic cultures. 
Thirdly, the manner in which standards are communicated, perpetuated and integrated 
into individual accountability webs is another way accountability in collectivistic and 
individualistic culture is expected to differ (Gelfand et al., p. 146). In individualistic 
cultures; there is direct communication of standards, which are formalized and explicit in 
symbolic forms in the social context. However, in collectivistic cultures there is indirect 
communication of standards, which “tend to be informal and implicit in the social context” 
(p. 145). Gelfand et al.  stress that this would mean that even though the same standard can 
be applied in individualistic and collectivistic cultures, the way it would be communicated 
would vary and comprehension of the standards would be dependent on an understanding of 
the social context. 
Finally, the differences in accountability webs for differing cultural systems will lead to 
differences in reactions to breaches in codes of conduct in an organizational setting. This is 
due to the differences in the type and perceptions of cross-level connections in 
organizations. As such, in collectivistic cultures, the group is held responsible for any 
violation to codes of conduct. In contrast, the individual is held accountable for violations of 
codes of conduct, regardless of group membership in individualistic cultures. 
Figure 1 provides an illustration of how an individual’s accountability web may be 
understood. The figure displays the type of connections an individual may perceive to have 
with the organisation, supervisor, workgroup and co-workers (Gelfand et al., 2004). Thus, 
considering the “multi- and cross-level relationships” (ibid, p. 138) an individual may have 
with parties in an organisation. Such connections will have an influence on the 
accountability relationships between the parties concerned. 
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Figure 1 Sample accountability web  
 
 
 
 
Key:                     Strong connections 
                             Weak connections 
[Source: Adapted from Gelfand et al. (2004, p. 138)] 
The cultural dimension of hierarchy versus egalitarianism is related to the direction of 
connections in accountability webs, which can be unidirectional or bidirectional. In 
hierarchical cultures, standards are predetermined, based on ascribed status and it is people 
with high-power positions that set standards to be obeyed by subordinates (ibid, p.148). On 
the other hand, in egalitarian cultures “standards are based on abstract principles that are 
mutually adhered to by individuals, regardless of status”. Therefore, in hierarchical cultures 
the direction of connections is expected to be unidirectional, whereas, in egalitarian cultures 
the direction of connections is bidirectional pertaining to mutual accountability. 
Gelfand et al. (p.146) referred to cultural tightness and looseness as contrasting cultural 
systems relating to the degree to which “norms are clearly defined and reliably imposed”. 
Hence, the nature of accountability webs within organisations of tight and loose cultures is 
expected to be differentiated by virtue of the strength of the connection and the degree of 
alignment of the accountability system (p. 147). 
Gelfand et al. further argue that in tight cultures order and predictability are important. 
There are clear social norms, which are strictly enforced with little tolerance for deviance 
(ibid, p. 146). Organisations in such culture “are more likely to enact processes to ensure 
expectations are delineated in policies, practices and procedures to create predictability and 
order” (ibid p. 147) through explicit mechanisms in individualistic cultures or implicit 
mechanisms in collectivistic cultures. Such cultures develop shared understandings of 
accountability (ibid, p. 148), resulting in “more alignment in accountability webs among 
individuals and their peers (horizontal alignment), individuals and their supervisors (vertical 
alignment), as well as individuals within and between groups (group alignment)”.  
Conversely, in loose cultures where “standards are fewer and more ambiguous” (Gelfand 
et al. ibid, p. 148), behaviours are not closely monitored and there are less severe 
consequences for deviance. Consequently, individuals understanding of accountability are 
more likely to vary resulting in a lack of alignment between individuals and groups with 
respect to accountability webs. Gelfand et al. suggest that this results in lesser predictability 
and order in the organization. 
Organisation 
Work group 
Supervisor 
Co-Worker 1 Individual Co-Worker 2 
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Gelfand et al. argue that in actual cultural systems the three cultural components would 
exist in combination and must be simultaneously considered to understand and predict the 
accountability behaviour that would exist in an organizational setting. Therefore, even 
though in reality any culture can have numerous forms of accountability webs existing, 
Gelfand et al. argue, a combination of the three cultural dimensions would create a 
particular accountability configuration that can be expected to exist in a given social 
context. Gelfand et al. consider four accountability configurations[11] that could exist in a 
particular culture. These include: an individualistic, loose, and egalitarian configuration; a 
collectivistic, tight, and hierarchical configuration; an individualistic, tight, and hierarchical 
configuration; and a collectivistic, loose, and egalitarian configuration. The nature of these 
configurations is summarised in table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 about here]  
Interestingly enough, no prior study of accountability in developing economies makes 
reference to Gelfand et al.’s (2004) work. The collectivistic, tight, hierarchical configuration 
would certainly appear to be appropriate to indigenous Fijian culture (see Brison, 2001; 
Brown, 2009; Davie, 2005; Durutalo, 1997; Hooper, 1982; Norton, 1992; Qalo, 1994; Qalo, 
1997; Ratuva, 2005; Ravuvu, 1983; Rika et al., 2008; Seruvakula, 2000).  
This study analyses the accountability of the former CEO of the Lau provincial company 
to the Board and that by the former CEO and the Board to the shareholders in the context of 
Gelfand et al.’s framework, comparing this with the accountability that may be expected to 
be found in a Fijian social system and considers the consequences of deviance in the 
accountabilities provided. 
4. Research issue and methodology 
Researching systems of accountability in Fiji’s provincial councils and companies is 
important given the increased calls for “reinforcing transparency, fairness and 
accountability” (Singh and Dakunivosa, 2001) in Fiji’s society. Review of the literature has 
identified the cultural traits particular to Fiji and the appropriate accountability web 
configuration as posited by Gelfand et al. (2004). This research is context specific and 
reveals the accountability processes and technologies used by the Lau provincial company 
under study.  
As Bracci argues (2009) the use of the concept of accountability webs provides a means 
of analysing accountability systems in the context of the culture in which the systems are 
applied and facilitates the redesign of such systems, internal and external, formal and 
informal. This avoids the cultural bias inherent in analysing accountability systems with 
systems that are seen to operate successfully in other contexts. Additionally, the use of a 
cultural-based approach is more effective in understanding the real functioning of 
accountability in the Lau provincial company. 
The present research is based on the naturalistic method of research, which utilizes an 
individual case study and detailed fieldwork. Naturalistic research commences from specific 
real-world situations; the main intention is to understand the systems of accountability that 
the Lau provincial company practices, given the cultural context in which they operate. 
Hence, the research explores the role of accountability in the context of the Lau provincial 
company, rather than seeking to provide generalisable conditions for a wide segment of 
society (Tompkins and Groves, 1983), in this case all provincial companies in Fiji. 
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The case study research approach is appropriate as it is suited (but not exclusive) to 
explanatory and exploratory studies ; the research questions relate to contemporary events, 
over which the researcher has little or no control and; the case method’s unique strength lies 
in its ability to deal with a full variety of evidence – documents, interviews and observations 
(Yin, 2003). This illustrates the ability of the “all-encompassing method” to collect a wide 
range of evidence for analysis and conclusions to be drawn (ibid).  
Bracci (2009) argued that case study research is an important method for theory 
construction, in the context of obtaining insights into the operation of accountability webs. 
The use of the case study research method is useful as it “…considers the values, interests, 
and operations of power involved – who gained, who lost, and why” (Cooper and Morgan, 
2008, p. 160). It also provides deeper understanding and helps articulate and explore the 
conflicts about values, interests and power in complex situations (ibid, p.164). This study 
explores the role of accountability in the context of the Lau provincial company in Fiji, by 
the use of an in depth case study from the periods 2009-2011. 
For the purposes of this research, data was collected through content analysis of the 
company’s annual general meeting minutes for the years 2006-2010, provincial council 
meeting minutes for the years 2006-2010 and annual reports of the Lau provincial council 
and company for the years 2006-2010, supplemented with other information in the public 
domain. Additionally, semi-structured interviews were conducted with the Chief Executive 
Officer on two occasions. The first interview was conducted in November 2009 and the 
second follow-up interview was conducted in April 2010.  Interviews were also conducted 
with the newly appointed Finance Manager in July, 2011 as the company was undergoing 
restructure. There were attempts to hold interviews with the Board of Directors but the 
researcher was always referred to the Finance Manager to answer questions in relation to the 
company. To get insights from the Lau provincial population, Tikina representatives and 
provincial council officials were also interviewed during the annual provincial council 
meeting in 2009. Follow-up interviews were conducted with provincial council officials 
between the periods 2009-2011, recognising that the Lau Provincial Council is the 
company’s largest shareholder. An interview was also held in 2009 with the iTaukei Affairs 
Board (TAB) officer responsible for small business financing to indigenous owned entities. 
All interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed upon completion and verified with the 
provincial council officials.  
Furthermore, observations at annual provincial council meetings for the years 2009-
2010 generated numerous field notes, containing a wide variety of impressions, comments 
and anecdotes. These field notes provided an overall impression of the relationship between 
the provincial council, the provincial population and the provincial company.  
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5. Accountabilities of the Lau provincial company 
The organisational structure of the Lau provincial company is illustrated below (Figure 2) to 
clarify the individuals, groups, and units that are part of the company’s system of 
accountability. 
Figure 2   Lau Provincial Company Organisational Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Lau Provincial Company, 2010) 
 
The accountability structure of the Lau provincial company follows from the 
organisational structure of the company (Fig. 2), as confirmed in an interview with the 
company’s CEO. This follows the conventional hierarchical accountability model common 
to companies, however, as argued by Bracci (2009, p. 299) lateral accountability and the 
types of cross-level relationships will be specific to the context. The Board of Directors 
(BOD) is accountable to both A and B class shareholders of the company in the company’s 
Annual General Meeting (AGM) and through the provision of the company’s annual report. 
There are two Board subcommittees that are accountable to the full BOD. The company’s 
CEO is directly accountable to the BOD, including the two Board subcommittees. 
Therefore, the company’s main accountability document to shareholders is through the 
annual report and accountability mechanisms are mainly the BOD with its subcommittees 
and through the assurance[12] process.  
 
In the company’s annual report and confirmed by the CEO in the interviews (2009-
2010), the CEO provides the following to the BOD 
• Management updates 
• Financial updates 
• Business investments update 
• Other issues that may arise in the company 
AGM: Shareholders 
Board of Directors 
Board Audit & HR 
Subcommittee 
Board Investment 
Subcommittee 
Company Secretary 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
Manager 1 
 
Manager 2 Manager 3 Manager 5 Manager 4 
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However, in follow up interviews with the Finance Manager (Interview Transcript, 
2011) it was revealed that there were shortcomings with the CEO’s accountability to the 
BOD. 
“…to be honest the board was given very limited information. The board requested 
for financials but they were never produced, hardly given, when it was given it was 
just in a nutshell no details, no analysis, so the board was quite in the dark on what 
was happening.” 
 
“…There were few questions raised but no follow-ups because at the end of the day 
there was a lot of trust. If you look at this company, the first CEO of the company 
upon his retirement, his own son took over as the CEO. There was a lot of trust put 
on him. There was no monitoring on the activities of the CEO or on his reports to 
the board.” 
 
Therefore, the CEO had complete autonomy in preparing the reports for the BOD and 
was in full control of the operations of the company. 
“The previous CEO was providing weak accountabilities to the board. He provided 
a good overview but he provided the overview of the company’s operations in such a 
way, as not to be questioned. The board were always given financial conditions that 
were always good. Therefore, the board had a difficult task on knowing what was 
happening. Thus, the content of the monthly reports that were being provided were 
not good for the BOD to base their decisions on. The board was in the dark on a lot 
of dealings the company was doing. Such as the company decided to invest into 
another company, becoming a subsidiary of the Company, when there was a need to 
appoint a director for that subsidiary, the CEO nominates and appoints himself. This 
creates a conflict of interest and also poor accountabilities to the BOD.” (Manager 
Finance Interview Transcript, 2011) 
The interview continued,- 
 “There were vague standards of accountability and the CEO decides what to report 
to the board and in what format.” (Manager Finance Interview Transcript, 2011) 
There is a unidirectional connection between the former CEO and the various elements 
of the Board of Directors to which he is accountable. The strength of the connections can be 
said to be weak, as there is little clarity in the role expectations of the CEO by the Board of 
Directors. Hence, due to the high level of trust put on the former CEO and the autonomy to 
make decisions in the company without being questioned, allowed him to negotiate his 
accountability to the board and the shareholders of the company. 
“The company owned by the provinces, the culture is such that the board hardly 
questions those in power and those in power have abused it to a lot of extent...” 
(Finance Manager Interview Transcript, 2011)  
 
In the company’s BOD, traditional authority is evident. Since the establishment of the 
company, the late paramount chief was the chair of the company until his demise. The late 
paramount chief was the sole decision maker in the BOD and also decided who would sit on 
the BOD (Interview Transcript CEO, 2009).  
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“Up until 2004, being a provincial company, the BOD were selected by the late 
paramount chief and he tried to ensure that the BOD were representative of the 
islands of Lau.” (Interview Transcript CEO, 2009) 
“For the Lau provincial company it was the case that the late paramount chief was 
the sole decision maker, whereas for other provincial companies it’s operated by 
groups of chiefs and qualified members of their province and decision making 
become very difficult...” (Interview Transcript TAB officer, 2009) 
The late paramount chief appointed the first CEO of the company, whom upon his 
retirement with the approval of the late paramount chief appointed the retired CEO’s son as 
the replacement CEO. In the two interview sessions conducted with the former CEO, he had 
reiterated that he is mainly accountable to the chair of the company.  The chair of the 
company, by virtue of chiefly status effectively controls the company. 
“I report to the chair of the company on a day to day basis but on a monthly basis 
basically we have board meetings and I submit management reports and the various 
papers that go to the board meeting… Basically, I submit reports to these two 
subcommittees but reporting line is basically to the chair of the company.” 
(Interview Transcript CEO, 2010) 
Therefore, weak ambiguous accountability is provided to the BOD as the directors were 
unable to challenge the chair of the company, neither did they have the expertise to call for 
the right accountabilities. 
Figure 3   Chief Executive Officer’s Accountability Web 
 
 
 
 
Tight connection 
Loose connection 
In contrast to the form of accountability that can be expected in an indigenous Fijian 
community where cultural values of collectivism, tightness and hierarchy would generate 
accountabilities to the immediate superiors, groups, the organisation and entities outside the 
organisation, resulting in a high number of cross-level connections, more clear standards of 
accountability and a high degree of monitoring (Gelfand et al., 2004, p. 150). The CEO 
succeeded in discharging his accountability consistent with the collectivistic, loose, 
hierarchical cultural configuration. The locus of accountability of the CEO is supposedly to 
the BOD as specified in the company’s corporate plan[13]. However, the standards of 
conduct and accountability expected of the CEO are implicit and vaguely defined. This 
resulted in the CEO having full autonomy in the operations of the company with insufficient 
monitoring, leading to a lack of responsibility and manipulation of reports to the BOD. In 
Chief Executive Officer 
Chairperson Board of Directors Annual Provincial 
Council meeting 
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light of Gelfand et al., the individualistic, tight, hierarchical accountability configuration 
expected to work in a typical company setting, is not effective in this context. Therefore, the 
policies, processes and mechanisms in place for providing such accountability would be 
ineffective, as the CEO has more of a collectivistic, loose, hierarchical cultural 
configuration. This could be attributed to the fact the CEO is of mixed descent, his father an 
indigenous Fijian whereas his mother is a kai valagi (i.e. a caucasian). Gelfand et al. (2004, 
p. 136) argues that a cultural perspective of accountability is crucial given that individuals 
from different cultures are able to understand the unique cultural configurations of 
accountability specific to a particular society.   
Effectively, Bracci (2009) highlighted that where there is autonomy without 
accountability. This is likely to lead to lack of responsibility in the organization, as without 
providing accountability, nobody was able to question his use of resources or assess the 
achievement of objectives. Although there were procedures in place for   the CEO to 
account to the BOD there was no monitoring of the CEO’s performance or reports. This is a 
result of the high level of trust placed on the CEO, which has led to the “…use of communal 
forms of accountability, where expectations are left ill-defined and ex-post probity and 
legality forms of reporting are likely to be accepted (if needed at all)” (Laughlin, 1996, p. 
230). Consequently the accountabilities provided to the BOD were misleading. 
 
5.1 Accountabilities provided to the Lau provincial population 
Accountability is also provided to its stakeholders[14]  through the annual Lau Provincial 
Council meeting. The company since its inception has always provided a presentation to the 
Lau Provincial Council and their presentation as mentioned by the CEO 
“… is basically a financial update and then  it talks about the upcoming 
developments, and usually members of the provincial council have opportunity to 
ask questions on how the company is progressing and some of them even give their 
views on certain developments or certain proposed developments…” (Interview 
Transcript CEO, 2010) 
Accountability to members of the province is primarily provided by the company’s 
CEO. The CEO is recognised by the Tikina representatives as the element to be held 
accountable for the affairs and performance of the Lau provincial company. 
“…I believe this will be the CEO, because the Chairwoman[15] it will be quite hard 
to talk with her because of her status.” (Tikina Representative 1 Interview 
Transcript, 2009) 
“This I believe is the CEO who runs the operations of the company.” (Tikina 
Representative 2 Interview Transcript, 2009) 
Whereas, some Tikina representatives have a lot of respect for the company as it was 
established by the late paramount chief and feel it is not their right to question the affairs of 
the company. Therefore, in conducting interviews with Tikina representatives there were 
instances where the Tikina representatives were hesitant to answer some of the questions 
posed, especially in regards to questioning the financial affairs of the company. 
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“I cannot really say anything against who is to be held accountable in the company 
because our elders have always told us that the establishment of the company was by 
our late high chief. He established and saw to the operations of the company, we as 
members of the province are grateful for his foresight and the people who are now 
running the company. The beneficiaries are the different Tikina(s) and individuals 
who have invested into the company, who are given the freedom to invest their 
money in their own provincial company.” (Tikina Representative 3 Interview 
Transcript, 2009) 
In interviews and observation of the Lau Provincial Council meeting, it was observed 
that Tikina representatives just have praise for the company’s achievements.  Upon 
questioning of the current level of accountability received, some of the Tikina 
representatives noted that they were satisfied with the current reports, whereas, some 
conveyed that they were overwhelmed by the complexity of financial reports. 
“I know the benefit it provides to us and to the province. The company has assets like 
no other provincial company and provides a good rate of dividends we benefit from. 
It is our responsibility as members of the province to invest in the company if we are 
to reap the benefits.” (Tikina Representative 3 Interview Transcript, 2009) 
“Yes, the financial affairs of the company are normally explained well to the 
members in the meeting and we always get written reports from the company…” 
(Tikina Representative 1 Interview Transcript, 2009) 
“…the company discusses its affairs at the provincial council meeting; both the CEO 
and Chairwoman will be there, members are happy to get clear explanations from 
them regarding the operations of the company.” (Tikina Representative 2 Interview 
Transcript, 2009) 
“The information that is provided to us as reports from the company is normally all 
aggregated together … It is in the provincial meeting that such information is 
explained by the CEO, then we are able to clearly understand the information 
provided…It is when we take this information to our Tikina that we face a big 
problem, as this depends on the education and knowledge of the Tikina 
Representative. If we the Tikina Representatives are educated and able to grasp the 
financial information disclosed we are able to explain it clearly as well to our Tikina 
members, otherwise than the Tikina Representative will just not be able to transmit 
this information back to the Tikina in a manner for the Tikina to understand it.” 
(Tikina Representative 4 Interview Transcript, 2009) 
Interestingly, it is the elder members (Tikina representatives 1, 2, 3) who were satisfied 
with the current level of reporting provided by the company, whereas, Tikina representative 
4, a younger member openly expressed how the current system of reporting based on 
accounting information was too complex. 
Additionally, an interview with an official from the Trading Facility through which the 
company shares can be bought and sold revealed that,- 
“…shareholders from the province have requested the company to provide the 
annual report in the Fijian language similar to that of Fijian Holdings Limited[16], 
as they could not understand the complex language of the current annual report.” 
(Trading Facility Officer Interview Transcript, 2011)  
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Furthermore, one of the many observations made by officers of the Provincial Council was,- 
“...our late paramount chief decided that all dividends of the Lau provincial council 
from its investments in the Lau provincial company were to be reinvested in the Lau 
provincial company. It was only after the death of our paramount chief that 
dividends have now been used to assist in the operational costs of the provincial 
council office.” (Interview Transcript Lau Provincial Council officer, 2011) 
It was also found that the majority of Class A shareholders, since the inception of the 
company had decided to reinvest their dividends into the company over the years in line 
with the direction given by the late paramount chief. However, over the years the company 
has not reflected these changes in the share capital[17] of Class A shareholders (Interview 
Transcript Finance Manager, 2011). Thus it can be concluded that provincial shareholders 
reinvested without knowing the terms of reinvestment, nor were they provided any real 
accountability in regards to the returns on their investment and were effectively unable to 
question the company due to the high power distance prevalent in this society. 
The company annual reports reviewed, for the years 2007-2010, meets statutory 
requirements with respect to the financials and governance. However there are no / minimal 
voluntary disclosures. Such narrow, economic, hierarchical forms of accountability as 
practiced by the company may actually lower any sense of responsibility towards the wider 
community (Butler, 2005; Messner, 2009). Similarly, Bracci (2009) argues that 
“accountability systems in organised anarchy may not find in accounting and formal 
reporting the most suitable tools of control and evaluation” (p. 297). 
 
Furthermore, the quality of accountability has been compromised to the extent that 
annual reports have not been produced and AGMs are not held on a timely basis,   the 
company’s AGM for the year ending 31st December 2007 was held in August the following 
year. For the year ending 31st December 2008 it was held in September, 2009.   
 
Further interviews with the trading facility revealed that the company did not follow the 
rules[18] of calling an AGM in 2010 to discuss 2009 financial results. 
“The Lau provincial company last year announced to the public the week prior to the 
AGM…however, companies must announce 21 days prior to the AGM. Hence, in the 
last AGM most members from the province did not make it to the AGM. In this 
year’s (2011) AGM for 2010 financial results, prior notice was given and most 
representatives from the province were present to ask questions concerning the 
company finances…” (Trading Facility Officer Interview Transcript, 2011)  
Such poor accountabilities provided to the provincial population has important 
implications, as it shows that the accountability frameworks of the company was first 
developed through the founder and accepted by the Board of Directors, and further 
developed by the current Chair of the company. Challenges to accountability within the 
company include the traditional custom of respect and not asking questions, for “to ask a 
question is to doubt” (Qalo, 1997, p. 116).  Traditional authority has dominated in decision-
making without providing the necessary accountability. As Roberts (2009, p. 362) reflected 
“hierarchy seems to powerfully inhibit talk” which results in securing “the public 
dominance of some opinions over others”. There has been reluctance by the board of 
directors to address and expose limitations that existed in the company. As Qalo (1997) 
argued this was tolerated, in order not to lose face.  
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Figure 4   Accountabilities as provided to the Lau provincial population 
 
 
 
          
  [Key:                   weak connections] 
Accountabilities provided to the provincial shareholders of the company are through the 
company’s AGM and the annual Lau provincial council meeting. Accountability provided is 
limited to what is being disclosed in the company’s annual report. This is limited to 
answerability, where accountability has been framed within the context of reporting 
mechanisms only (Smyth, 2012). From the company’s perspective, the CEO (Interview 
Transcripts 2009, 2010) has argued there is accountability where reporting is provided at the 
AGM and the provincial council meeting. From observations at the Lau provincial council 
meeting, the CEO would provide narrative updates to the province with the distribution of 
the company’s annual report. The credibility of the oral report is sustained by reference back 
to the numbers provided in the audited financial statements. Issues that cannot be addressed 
in this context go unanswered. The CEO and the chair would always refer the province to 
the numbers. As argued by Kamuf (2007) questioners are effectively told “Numbers do not 
lie, Read the numbers, the numbers tell the story…” (p. 252), even when the numbers do not 
address the issues raised. 
While the Tikina representative were able to understand the CEO’s oral presentations in 
the annual provincial council meeting, lacking an educational background in accounting 
they were unable to understand the financial statements. Consequently they were unable to 
effectively disseminate such information back to their respective districts.  
Utilizing Gelfand et al.’s cultural accountability configurations (see Table 1) it can be 
argued that the accountability provided to the provincial population follows a collective, 
loose and hierarchical cultural accountability configuration. This is seen where the locus of 
accountability is to groups, at the AGM and provincial council meeting. However, rather 
than more cross-level connections as predicted for collectivistic cultures, the accountability 
of the company to the provincial population has very few cross-level connections. The only 
connection is the CEO and the Chair of the company to the provincial council. Exercising 
the chairperson’s powerful chiefly status they are able to negotiate their accountabilities to 
the province. Given that the Lau province is a hierarchical society there are unidirectional 
accountability connections, hence the provincial population cannot openly challenge the 
accountabilities provided by the company. 
  
Chief Executive Officer Chairperson 
Company AGM Annual Provincial Council meeting 
Board of Directors 
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6. Discussion and conclusion 
The province assisted the Lau provincial company financially in its formative years, by 
channelling funds to it, through the copra development fund, harvest of pine plantations, the 
government development assistance scheme to the provinces and provincial festivals (fund 
raising activities). Such decisions were made by the late paramount chief, founder and 
former chair of the provincial council and company, together with other Lauan elite, whose 
judgments are considered above question in Lauan culture. 
While the Lau provincial company can be considered a successful business enterprise 
when compared to companies set up by other provincial councils, its financial achievements 
can be best assessed by comparing its performance with that of Fijian Holdings Limited 
(FHL). FHL (2012) was founded in 1984 to accelerate indigenous Fijian participation in the 
economy. It operates as an investment vehicle. Its shareholders include Provincial Councils, 
which were allocated shares to be paid for from initial dividends, other Fijian institutions, 
Tikina and village groups, Fijian co-operatives, individual Fijians and family companies 
(Fijian Holdings Limited).  FHL is quoted on the South Pacific Stock Exchange restricted 
list. That is to say, its shares can only be held by indigenous Fijians. A comparison of the 
returns by way of dividends by the two companies is instructive. 
[Insert Table 2] 
The purchase price for FHL relates to the final trade of each year. The purchase price 
for the Lau provincial company shares is the quotation obtained from the Kontiki 
Stockbroking Limited (KSB), which offers an over the counter trading facility, however the 
shares are not actively traded. Consequently comparison of capital gains/losses of the two 
investments is not meaningful. From the perspective of an investor any outlay in shares in 
the Lau provincial company is a sunk cost[19]. The relative attractiveness of the two 
investments is reflected in their dividend yields. An investor who purchased shares in FHL 
at $3.50 in 2007 would earn a superior return in all subsequent years to the return on an 
investment in the Lau provincial company at $1.50. These outcomes demonstrate that the 
Lau provincial council and the provincial population would have been better served by 
investing in FHL rather than by persisting with their own provincial company. Given Lau is 
a maritime province, the population may have looked to the provincial company to provide 
shipping services, operating wharves, investment in agriculture and fishing activities, 
building ice plants and the like.  
Instead of operating to promote economic development in the Lau province, the 
company has actually drawn resources from the province and invested them elsewhere. 
Since the founder chairman’s death this includes loans made on concessionary bases to 
companies operating on the mainland by certain elite Lauans, notably the founder 
chairman’s / paramount chief’s family. Central government monies allocated to provide 
development assistance in the province has also been redirected to the company. The 
directors representing the A class shareholders all live on Fiji’s mainland, so although the 
majority of ‘A’ class shareholders reside in the province, they are effectively 
disenfranchised. Accountability provided to ‘A’ class shareholders residing on Fiji’s 
mainland has enabled these parties to challenge the direction the company has taken, but to 
date with no real success. These shareholders have however received some incidental 
benefits over and above their dividend payments being able to access accommodation at the 
company’s hotels at discounted prices and through living in the economy that the company 
has invested in. Only since 2008 have dividends from the Lau provincial council’s 
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shareholding been used to sustain its activities. With cuts in central government funding to 
the provinces dividends have been channelled to sustain the provincial council’s 
administration, not to financing development projects. It is impossible to escape the 
conclusion that the Lau provincial company has retarded economic development in the Lau 
province rather than enhanced it. Since the province only benefits through the dividend 
stream, the province would be better served by investing in FHL and securing higher 
returns.  
This paper explores the establishment of the Lau provincial company and its systems of 
accountability to the provincial population. In consequence, findings showed that the former 
CEO was providing poor accountabilities to the BOD. The company had in place a formal 
hierarchical accountability system typical to companies; however, cultural factors rendered 
such policies, processes and mechanisms relatively ineffective, illustrating a lack of 
structural alignment (Gelfand et al., 2004).  
Gelfand et al. (2004) predict in line with indigenous Fijian culture a collective, tight and 
hierarchical cultural accountability configuration. This would have resulted in informal and 
implicit communication of standards which would be clearly understood by members. There 
would be shared understandings of accountability among members of society due to the 
high number of cross-level connections and a higher degree of monitoring, with severe 
consequences for deviance. However, from this paper it is evident that the controlling party 
of the Lau provincial company is the late paramount chief’s family. Deference shown to the 
late paramount chief and his family in the interview responses on the Tikina representatives 
and the willingness of communal shareholders in the province to reinvest their dividends at 
the direction of the paramount chief point clearly to the fact traditional cultural values still 
hold in the province. High power distance prevails. Therefore, even though indigenous 
Fijian society has such cultural values as collective, tight, hierarchical, it cannot be expected 
that such a corresponding cultural accountability configuration as predicted by Gelfand et 
al. (2004) would hold in the context of the Lau provincial company. As a result full and 
relevant accountability is not provided to the provincial population, neither would the 
provincial population be able to openly challenge the accountabilities provided.  
The literature shows that accountability is central to providing effective functioning 
within entities, as it ensures the discharge of responsibility by those in charge (Bracci 2009; 
Velayutham and Perera, 2004). The Lau provincial company’s formal system of 
accountability of the company follows an individualistic/hierarchical configuration that is 
accountability from the unit managers to the CEO to the board of directors to the 
shareholders. It is based on agent principal relationships found in developed Western 
economies. However, utilising Gelfand et al. there were weak connections found between 
the CEO and the BOD; the BOD and the shareholders; the CEO and the provincial 
population; and the Chair and the provincial population. The standards of accountability are 
implicit and vaguely defined, permitting the CEO to negotiate the terms of the relationship 
with the board, changing the nature of accountability. Additionally, the processes of 
accountability in the company were implicit and there was no monitoring of the 
performance and reports of the CEO. The board had a high level of trust in the CEO creating 
the potential for value conflict. This is as high trust leads to the use of communal forms of 
accountability where expectations are ill-defined. Consequently the CEO was not held 
accountable. Ultimately this led to the dismissal of the CEO.  
Utilising Gelfand et al. the cultural accountability configuration shows an 
individualistic/loose/hierarchical accountability configuration resulting in the company 
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operating based on the decisions of the elite few, without being questioned on how 
resources have been utilized or objectives have been achieved.  Certainly some resources 
have been diverted to benefit elite parties. The recent interest free loan extended to a private 
company owned by the late paramount chief’s family, demonstrates that the Chair of the 
Board also exercises control over accountabilities. Such a loan is noted in the financial 
statements (2010) to be receivable on demand; however, because of power distance issues it 
may be difficult to demand repayment of the loan. Without change in accountability 
configurations the company’s failure to provide returns to its shareholders through either 
distributable dividends or services may be perpetuated. Inappropriate accountabilities have 
led to the company not operating towards its stated mission.   
       Indigenous Fijian culture, however, still influences accountability, especially the large 
power distance in societies (see Davie 2005, 2007), the high levels of trust placed on those 
in charge coupled with the lack of self-accountability, the culture of respect and silence, and 
the lack of attention to detail and planning (Qalo, 1997) all promote weak forms of 
accountability. Strong forms of accountability can be practiced by communities. This 
requires explicit, unambiguous documented procedures to be established. Additionally, such 
standards of performance and accountability have to be monitored with consequences for 
deviance established, in order to be taken seriously. Smyth (2012) argued “the essential core 
of an accountability relationship is that unless there is a form of control based on ‘reward or 
sanction’ then the relationship is not one of accountability” (p. 232). Similarly, Ratuva 
(2002) recommended that the economic feasibility and credibility of such indigenous owned 
companies needs to be facilitated by a clearly defined system of constant monitoring and a 
transparent reporting process.  
       Reconstructing accountabilities can impact favourably on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the provincial administration system and the commercial arms of the 
provinces. If prevailing cultures impede such a transformation the Fijian administration may 
be obliged to conclude that provincial development cannot be delivered by companies 
established and influenced by provincial councils. While this conclusion is drawn from an 
analysis of one province and its related company, it must be born in mind that all other 
provincial companies have been consistently unprofitable[20]. 
       The development companies of other provinces have all attempted to engage in their 
provincial economies at some time in their operations. This offers opportunities for future 
research, together with additional analysis on the cultural configuration of indigenous Fijian 
societies and their corresponding accountability system. Future research can explore how 
changes in indigenous Fijian societies have impacted, or failed to impact on the nature, 
forms and processes of accountability. Additionally, further studies can be undertaken on 
the other provincial companies to identify how cultural factors impact internal and external 
accountability divergence and its effects on the efficiency and effectiveness of such 
companies. It is of great importance to heed the call made by Roberts (2009) regarding the 
need to explore “the possibility of our doing accountability differently” (p. 968) and 
considering intelligent forms of accountability that would effectively benefit the grassroots 
provincial population if provincial development companies are to fulfil their missions.  
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Notes 
1. That is referring to the primary cultural dimensions of ‘individualism and 
collectivism’, ‘cultural tightness and looseness’, and ‘hierarchy versus 
egalitarianism’. 
2. The TAB is responsible for the Fijian Administration, which includes all the 
provinces in Fiji. 
3. A provincial council shall be made up of mata-ni-tikina(s) (Tikina representatives); 
Tikina chiefs; women’s representative; youth representatives; and urban dwellers 
representatives (Fijian Affairs Provincial Councils Regulations, 1996). 
4. The Indo-Fijian population first came to Fiji as a result of the economic imperatives 
of colonialism. This necessitated the import of indentured Indian labourers to Fiji 
between the periods 1879 to 1916 to extract profit from the sugar plantations 
(Ghosh, 2000). 
5. Who was also prime minister of Fiji during this period. 
6. Individual shareholders of the provincial company could benefit from discounted 
rates when staying at the hotels. 
7. These are the individuals from the Lau province who have migrated from the islands 
and are now residing outside of the Lau province in the rural and urban centres of 
Fiji. 
8. Also referred to as the ‘Tui Nayau’, who is the paramount chief of the Lau province. 
The latest holder of this title was the late Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara. The successor to 
this title has not been installed since the death of the late paramount chief in April, 
2004. Extended vacancies of this kind are commonplace in Fiji. 
9. Numerous attempts were made to interview the board of directors but the author was 
referred to the former CEO and when the former CEO was relieved of his role, the 
author was referred to the Finance Manager. 
10. This refers to the connections between individuals and their groups, and also the 
connections between these groups and the organisation as a whole (Gelfand et al., 
2004, p. 139). 
 
11. Gelfand et al. (2004) locates eight different accountability configurations but 
discusses only the above four. 
12. The company since its inception continues to hire the same auditors. 
 
13. From interviews conducted it was gathered that the CEO’s performance targets are 
determined from the corporate plan of the company, which is assessed annually by 
the BOD. 
 
14. The provincial council represents the interests of the province and majority of 
provincial members invest in the company through their monetary contributions to 
the provincial council. 
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15. The current chairperson is the daughter of the late paramount chief and also wife of 
the current President of Fiji. 
16. FHL (2012) was founded in 1984 to accelerate indigenous Fijian participation in the 
economy. It operates as an investment vehicle. Its shareholders include Provincial 
Councils, which were allocated shares to be paid for from initial dividends, other 
Fijian institutions, Tikina and village groups, Fijian co-operatives, individual Fijians 
and family companies.  FHL is quoted on the South Pacific Stock Exchange 
restricted list. That is to say, its shares can only be held by indigenous Fijians. 
17. In 2009 the share register was requested for analysis by the primary researcher. 
However, the CEO referred the author to Fiji’s Registrar of Companies. The 
Registrar of Companies had an outdated copy, which only showed the initial 
shareholdings by the provincial population. 
18. Companies Law section 135(1) (a) ‘Length of notice for calling meeting’. 
  
19. In contrast FHL is the most liquid stock traded on the SPSE. 
20. One such company, Namosi Provincial Company is the subject of a separate study. 
In this case serious shortcomings in accountability between the company and the 
provincial population were found. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Cultural accountability configurations – implications at multiple levels 
 
 
 
 
  
Organizational level 
Example of 
cultural 
configurations 
Locus of 
Accountability 
 
Standards 
(explicit or 
implicit) 
Number of cross-
level connections 
Strength of accountability webs 
1. No. of standards 
2. Clarity of standards 
3. Degree of monitoring 
Overall alignment within 
the organisational system 
1. 2. 3. 
Individualistic, 
loose, egalitarian 
The self and peers 
/ Supervisor Explicit Low Few Low Low Low 
Collectivistic, 
tight, hierarchical 
The immediate 
supervisor, group, 
the organization 
and entities 
outside the 
organization (e.g., 
families) 
Implicit High More High High High 
Individualistic, 
tight, hierarchical 
Self, superior, and 
the organization Explicit Moderate More High High High 
Collectivistic, 
loose, egalitarian 
The group and 
entities outside 
the organization 
(e.g., families) 
Implicit Moderate Fewer Low Low Low 
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Interpersonal/group context and individual level 
Example cultural 
configurations Amount of role 
sending 
Nature of 
role sending 
Degree of 
role conflict 
Felt 
responsibility 
to external 
standards 
Amount of 
self-accountability 
Strength of 
reactions to 
violations of 
standards 
Individualistic, 
loose, egalitarian High 
Greater role 
making High Low High Low 
Collectivistic, tight, 
hierarchical Low 
Greater role 
taking Low High Low High 
Individualistic, 
tight, hierarchical Low 
Greater role 
taking Low Moderate High Moderate 
Collectivistic, loose, 
egalitarian High 
Greater role 
making High Moderate Low Moderate 
Source: Gelfand et al. (2004, p. 150) 
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Table 2: Comparative analysis of Lau Provincial Company (LPC) and FHL - Dividends 
2007-2010 
Year Company Purchase price 
per share 
Dividend per 
share 
Dividend yield 
2007 LPC  
FHL 
$1.50 
$3.50 
$0.10 
$0.3911 
6.7% 
11.2% 
2008 LPC 
FHL 
$1.90 
$2.16 
$0.10 
$0.3911 
5.3% 
18.1% 
2009 LPC 
FHL 
$1.90 
$2.79 
$0.05 
$0.6823 
2.6% 
24.5% 
2010 LPC 
FHL 
$1.90 
$3.22 
$0.10 
$0.4389 
5.3% 
13.6% 
Source: LPC annual reports and the South Pacific Stock Exchange 
 
 
 
